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INTRODUCTION 
Eight months after his famous and lonely objections to Plessy v. 
Ferguson,1 Justice Harlan again dissented alone. Once more, the Court 
was hollowing out the Reconstruction Amendments’ promises of liberty 
and equality, but unlike Plessy, Robertson v. Baldwin2 is an obscure de-
cision. It holds no place in the anticanon of constitutional error, not even 
a nomination. To the contrary, courts continue to rely upon it, though 
always in passing. 
What provokes this Essay is an occasion to attend more carefully to 
Justice Harlan’s wisdom, which quietly haunts Thirteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence. That provocation is the routine threat and actual practice 
of incarcerating Americans for not working, or not working hard enough; 
a practice visited disproportionately on low-income communities of col-
or. This practice represents an extreme extension of broader patterns that 
construe racial and economic inequality as manifestations of personal 
vice and thus as occasions for inflicting further punishment.3 These occa-
sions involve not just the withdrawal of the social welfare state, but also 
its substitution with the carceral state, which “depends for its legitimacy 
on the widespread belief that all those who appear trapped at the bottom 
actually chose their fate.”4 
This Essay offers a provocation of its own. I suggest that these 
practices are constitutionally dubious, despite being widely implemented 
and actively embraced by mainstream Democrats, hardly obscure author-
itarian outposts. These doubts emerge through redescribing, in labor 
terms, a set of policies that generally are analyzed under quite different 
rubrics: child support enforcement and criminal justice debt collection, as 
well as probation, parole, and related techniques of “community supervi-
sion.” In each case, work is offered for noble purposes and as a benevo-
                                                     
 1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 2. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
 3. See, e.g., JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE 
PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011). 
 4. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 248 (2012). 
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lent “alternative to incarceration.” But when low-income communities, 
of disproportionately people of color, are offered incarceration as the 
alternative to work, Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence should go to 
high alert. 
These coercive labor practices are redolent of peonage, one compo-
nent of the Jim Crow South’s broader system of racial labor control, 
which leveraged a racist criminal justice system into an institution of la-
bor subordination. That system, too, often flew the banner of disciplining 
the dissolute laborer and containing his threat to social order. This Essay 
is no attempt at a comprehensive treatment of either the present situation 
or the historical analogy. Instead, it is a call for such examination. 
Robertson’s obscure vitality suggests the divergent paths followed 
by the constitutional jurisprudence of race and labor.5 With no apparent 
connection to the Jim Crow South, Robertson never faced a reassessment 
in light of the Court’s peonage jurisprudence, which traditionally has 
been situated in the jurisprudence of racial justice.6 Indeed, the case arose 
far away in miles and context. Robert Robertson was a San Francisco 
seaman,7 apparently white,8 who thought better of his voyage on the bar-
kentine Arago.9 Upon arrival in Oregon, he exercised with three ship-
mates what one might have thought was their constitutional right to 
quit.10 But instead, they were jailed until the Arago set sail again, hauled 
back to the ship by a marshal, forced to work the remainder of the voy-
age, and criminally prosecuted for their insubordination upon return to 
San Francisco. All this occurred pursuant to federal statute, and all this 
was forcefully upheld by the Supreme Court.11 
                                                     
 5. See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case 
of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Preju-
dice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 646, 662 n.58 (1982). But see Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 351, 380 (2001); James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitu-
tional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1487–88 (2010). 
 7. See Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of 
New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 279 n.16 (2004) (discussing 
terminology of “seamen” versus “sailor”). 
 8. Robertson’s race was not explicitly stated by the Court or in the briefing, but given that the 
Court took pains to distinguish the case from several contexts characterized in racial terms, it seems 
likely that only whiteness could have seemed unnecessary to note. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 
U.S. 275, 283 (1897). 
 9. Id. at 275. 
 10. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 437, 496 (1989). 
 11. To be sure, Robertson’s obscurity may also derive from the fact, instructive in its own 
right, that the statutes it upheld were repealed shortly thereafter. See, e.g., Tucker v. Alexandroff, 
183 U.S. 424, 431 (1902); White, supra note 7, at 293 n.70. Then again, that fact enhances Robert-
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Robertson’s significance lies in its unique crack in the wall between 
penal compulsion and the private labor market. Justice Harlan decried it 
for that reason, objecting that, 
In my judgment, the holding of any person in custody, whether in 
jail or by an officer of the law, against his will, for the purpose of 
compelling him to render personal service to another in a private 
business, places the person so held in custody in a condition of in-
voluntary servitude, forbidden by the constitution of the United 
States.12 
Larger breaches of Harlan’s principle are invited by today’s era of prolif-
erating criminal justice control and shrinking labor rights. 
I. PRESENT DAY INCARCERATION FOR NONWORK 
Three contemporary contexts generate requirements to work for a 
private business on pain of arrest or incarceration, contrary to Justice 
Harlan’s principle. Although not typical of low-wage work today, neither 
are they marginal. Moreover, they either are on the rise or show substan-
tial growth potential. Each involves legally authorized physical vio-
lence—arrest and incarceration. Thus, like Robertson, they raise none of 
the subtleties associated with contemporary Thirteenth Amendment con-
troversies over what conduct constitutes compulsion.13 Instead, the only 
issues are whether the thing compelled is “servitude” and, if so, whether 
the resulting involuntary servitude nonetheless falls outside the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s prohibition on just that. 
A. Probation, Parole, and Other Community Supervision 
The most straightforward example is the duty to seek and maintain 
employment as a standard condition of probation and parole.14 As with 
any such condition, a violation—not working—may trigger 
(re)incarceration. The scope of these work requirements is vast. Nearly 
five million adults are on probation or parole at any time,15 and that 
number increases if one considers all who pass through these systems in 
the course of a year, decade, or lifetime. Black and Latino inmates con-
                                                                                                                       
son’s peculiarity insofar as the opinion rested on the notion that forced labor was a timeless and 
necessary feature of seafaring. 
 12. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 303. 
 13. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944–53 (1988); Kathleen C. Kim, The Coercion 
of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409 (2011). 
 14. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 310 (2015). 
 15. ERINN J. HERBERMAN, PH.D. & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248029, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 
(rev. ed. 2015), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus13.pdf. 
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stitute a large majority of those incarcerated for probation or parole vio-
lations, and the disproportionality increases further when considering 
only violations related to nonwork or, closely related, nonpayment of 
financial obligations.16 
Despite the penal exception to the Thirteenth Amendment,17 the 
Amendment may still apply to these work conditions because they argu-
ably are not imposed as a “punishment,” but rather as a means to pro-
mote social integration and prevent future offending.18 That separation 
from the “punishment” exception is particularly clear for closely related 
and increasingly popular forms of community supervision that operate as 
“diversions” designed to avoid a criminal sentence, not as part of such a 
sentence.19 Nonetheless, the proximity to criminal sentencing makes 
these work requirements less legally provocative than the next. 
B. Criminal Justice Debt 
Second, the nation is rightly awash in concern over modern-day 
debtors’ prisons. The primary focus has been on debt arising from as-
sessment of fines and fees through the criminal justice system.20 Such 
exactions range from financial punishments accompanying imprison-
ment,21 tickets for minor quality of life offenses or traffic violations,22 to 
the obligation to reimburse the state for the costs of providing criminal 
defense counsel under Gideon.23 Unlike most ordinary private debts, 
these often are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and unlike all private 
debts, criminal justice debts can subject the debtor to imprisonment for 
nonpayment.24 
                                                     
 16. NOAH D. ZATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T, UCLA LABOR 
CTR. & A NEW WAY OF LIFE REENTRY PROJECT, GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE 
RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (2016), available at http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/get-to-work-or-
go-to-jail/. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (abolishing involuntary servitude “except as a punishment 
for crime”). 
 18. See Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Application of 
the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 415–16 (2009). 
 19. See Allegra M McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting 
Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012). 
 20. See Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in 
the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756–60 (2010); see also Beth A. Colgan, 
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014). 
 21. See Harris et al., supra note 20. 
 22. See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE S.F. BAY AREA ET AL., NOT JUST A 
FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 13 (2015) [herein-
after LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS], available at http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-California-4.20.15.pdf. 
 23. See Beth A. Colgan, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1932–33 (2014). 
 24. See generally Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons (Aug. 4, 
2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
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Notwithstanding the close historical connection between imprison-
ment for debt and forced labor, the contemporary discourse on debtors’ 
prisons has largely ignored the complementary phenomenon of debt pe-
onage.25 That connection is forged most directly when the debtor’s ina-
bility to pay becomes the basis for being ordered to work, typically with-
out payment, in what is commonly termed “community service.”26 Thus, 
the indigent debtor’s choice between paying and going to jail is glorious-
ly expanded to embrace the choice between jail and forced, unpaid labor. 
Criminal justice debt has been subjected to far less academic study 
and systematic data collection than probation and parole, so its precise 
scope is unknown. Nonetheless, it clearly is enormous and has been 
growing.27 In California alone, each year about 500,000 people have their 
driver’s licenses suspended just for unpaid citations and subsequent 
fees.28 Given the massive racial disproportionality in everything ranging 
from traffic citations to felony convictions, there is every reason to ex-
pect similar disparities in criminal justice debt and its consequences.29 In 
Los Angeles, well over 50,000, and likely over 100,000, people are as-
signed to court-ordered community service each year.30 
Although courts have long assumed that a sentence of hard labor in 
lieu of a fine falls within the Amendment’s penal exception,31 modern 
authorities have refused to extend that principle to administrative fees.32 
“Consequently, a statute requiring a convicted defendant who is unable 
to reimburse the State for such expenses to satisfy his debt by performing 
uncompensated labor for the State would be proscribed by the 
[T]hirteenth [A]mendment.”33 It is unclear how much influence this prin-
ciple has had in practice and, in any event, it does not apply to fines. 
                                                                                                                       
_id=2639709. 
 25. One recent article squarely connects contemporary criminal justice debt to the Jim Crow 
practice of peonage. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 
(2015). However, its analogy relies entirely on the role of criminal justice, cycles of debt, and eco-
nomic and racial stratification without making any connection to forced labor, even when directly 
suggesting the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment. See id. at 1603, 1638–40. Indeed, the article 
appears to embrace certain forms of compulsory labor as an alternative to incarceration. See id. at 
1676. 
 26. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1209.5 (West 2016); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf (ad-
vocating community service as an alternative to incarceration for nonpayment). 
 27. See Harris et al., supra note 20, at 1756. 
 28. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 13. 
 29. Id. at 19; Harris et al., supra note 20, at 1760–63. 
 30. Zatz et al., supra note 16. 
 31. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914). 
 32. See Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 144, 151 (N.H. 1981) (surveying authorities). 
 33. Id. at 151. 
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Given that this form of forced labor originates in an independent criminal 
proceeding,34 as well as the potential application of other ad hoc excep-
tions to the Amendment’s scope,35 I defer the topic in favor of lower-
hanging fruit closer to the problem of Robertson. Another distinction is 
that compelled labor originating in criminal justice debt thus far appears 
to be concentrated in the public and non-profit sectors. 
C. Child Support Enforcement 
Of principal interest here is a third context of contemporary work 
coerced under threat of incarceration: child support enforcement. Like 
criminal justice debt, child support obligations occupy a special status 
among debts. Nonpayment exposes the obligor to incarceration through 
civil contempt proceedings36 or through criminal prosecution.37 This is 
no idle threat.38 To the contrary, in larger U.S. cities, a shocking 15% of 
African-American fathers are at some point incarcerated for nonpayment 
of child support.39 
The intersection between race and poverty affects not only which 
obligors are unable to pay, but also which obligors are targeted for en-
forcement. Enforcement, both with regard to establishing child support 
obligations and then collecting payment, focuses heavily on noncustodial 
parents of children who receive some form of public assistance because 
their custodial household has very low income.40 The state has a special 
financial interest in these cases because it seizes child-support payments 
to reimburse itself for public assistance spending, and so the politics of 
child support are intimately linked to those of welfare reform, themselves 
thoroughly shaped by racial antagonism.41 Thus, the racial dynamics of 
threatening incarceration for nonwork do not begin with the carceral 
                                                     
 34. For an important case on the scope of the penal exception, see United States v. Reynolds, 
235 U.S. 133 (1914) (holding that an agreement to work for a surety who assumed financial respon-
sibility for a fine was independent of the prior criminal proceeding and thus fell outside the penal 
exception). 
 35. See infra Part III. 
 36. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 431 (2011); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind 
Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their 
Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 618 (2012); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and 
the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 95, 121 (2008). 
 37. See Criminal Nonsupport and Child Support, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/criminal-nonsupport-and-child-support.aspx#50 (last 
updated June 2015). 
 38. See Brito, supra note 36. 
 39. See Zatz, supra note 16. 
 40. See generally Brito, supra note 36. 
 41. See SOSS ET AL., supra note 3; MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, 
MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999). 
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threat but must be traced to the sources of the duty to work, whether in 
the racial profiling of police stops, the racial disproportionately that runs 
from prosecution to sentencing, or the welfare retrenchment that “privat-
izes dependency.”42 
The link from debt to labor is forged by the legal consensus that the 
duty to pay child support includes a duty to work in order to pay.43 This 
principle provides the basis for incarcerating obligors who are too poor 
to pay, and poverty is endemic among obligors in arrears.44 One study 
found that in California, over 80% of those in arrears had annual incomes 
below $20,000, and over 60% had annual incomes below $10,000.45 
Because the duty to pay encompasses a duty to work, refusing or 
quitting a job can be construed as refusing to pay, as indeed can the bare 
fact of unemployment.46 One of the leading cases for that proposition is 
the California Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Moss v. Superior Court. 
Moss concerned a defendant whose unemployment elicited incarceration 
on the assumption that he, like any able-bodied adult, surely “could get a 
job flipping hamburgers at MacDonald’s [sic].”47 The court’s use of civil 
contempt to produce compliance embraces just what Justice Harlan be-
lieved should be forbidden, “the purpose of compelling [the child support 
obligor] to render personal service to another in a private business.”48 
And McDonald’s, of course, is no exceptional or marginal type of busi-
ness, as the 19th century merchant marine might seem to be;49 rather, it is 
the heartland of the modern service economy.50 
This focus on participation in existing low-wage labor markets also 
shapes current policy initiatives to translate the general duty to seek and 
maintain employment into a duty to participate in work programs that 
                                                     
 42. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
108 (2004). 
 43. See United States v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1999); Moss v. Superior Court, 
950 P.2d 59, 73 (Cal. 1998). 
 44. See ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., ASSESSING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN NINE LARGE 
STATES AND THE NATION (2007), available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75136/ 
report.pdf; Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibman, Getting to Know Poor Fathers Who Do Not Pay Child 
Support, 75 SOC. SERVICE REV. 420, 422 (2001). 
 45. DR. ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., EXAMINING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN CALIFORNIA: THE 
COLLECTIBILITY STUDY 7 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/research/publication/examining 
-child-support-arrears-california-collectibility-study/view/full_report. 
 46. See sources cited supra note 43. 
 47. Moss, 950 P.2d at 63. 
 48. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.  275, 303 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 49. On the exceptionalism of labor law at sea, see White, supra note 7. 
 50. Today, the presumption of job availability may be shifting toward an even lower baseline: 
the sporadic “gig” with Uber. See Cesar Conda & Derek Khanna, Uber for Welfare, POLITICO (Jan. 
27, 2016, 7:02 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/1/uber-welfare-sharing-gig-
economy-000031#ixzz3zSO8rSGy. 
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direct, monitor, and discipline those efforts.51 For instance, the Obama 
administration recently proposed new child support regulations that pro-
mote a “Work First” approach that prioritizes “rapid labor force attach-
ment” over “promot[ing] access to better jobs and careers.”52 Notably, 
this program also embraces incarceration for failure to participate in such 
programs. 
Although the courts and executive agencies make this connection 
between debt and work, the existing scholarship generally has focused on 
obligors’ lack of income, their procedural rights, and child support’s in-
teraction with the social welfare system for children and custodial par-
ents.53 To the extent that obligors’ employment is considered, the prima-
ry focus has been on the potential for the support obligations to deter 
work by effectively taxing earnings that the obligor must hand over in 
support.54 No attention has been given to Moss and other leading Thir-
teenth Amendment cases stemming from child support enforcement.55 
II. INCARCERATION FOR NONWORK IN THE PAST: LESSONS FROM 
PEONAGE 
Contemporary incarceration for nonwork is illuminated by its his-
torical analogues. In Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the obvious 
foil is peonage. In a series of cases from 1905 to 1944, the Supreme 
Court consistently found Thirteenth Amendment infirmity when workers 
faced public or private violence for failing or refusing to work for an 
employer to whom they owed a debt.56 These cases primarily concerned 
                                                     
 51. See Elaine Sorensen, Rethinking Public Policy Toward Low-Income Fathers in the Child 
Support Program, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 604 (2010). 
 52. Flexibility, Efficiency, and Modernization in Child Support Enforcement Programs, 79 
Fed. Reg. 68,548, 68,558 (Nov. 17, 2014) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 301–309). 
 53. See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY 
L. & POL’Y 127 (2011); Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by 
Rethinking Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 775 
(2012); Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of 
Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007); Solangel 
Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 991 (2006); sources cited supra note 36. But see Yiyoon Chung, Child Support As Labor 
Regulation, 38 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 73 (2011). 
 54. See, e.g., Maria Cancian et al., Discouraging Disadvantaged Fathers’ Employment: An 
Unintended Consequence of Policies Designed to Support Families, 32 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 758 (2013); Harry J. Holzer et al., Declining Employment Among Young Black Less-
Educated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 329 
(2005); Daniel P. Miller & Ronald B. Mincy, Falling Further Behind? Child Support Arrears and 
Fathers’ Labor Force Participation, 86 SOC. SERVICE REV. 604 (2012). 
 55. For instance, they are not cited, let alone discussed, in any of the articles listed supra, notes 
36, 53, and 54. 
 56. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 
(1911); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 
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“false pretenses” statutes that created a separate criminal offense for 
fraudulently obtaining an advance on a labor contract, where criminal 
intent was presumed based on the bare fact of quitting before the advance 
was repaid; another statute criminally enforced a surety arrangement in 
which the employer paid off a defendant’s criminal justice debt in ex-
change for a promise to repay through labor.57 These statutes were part of 
a broader web of legal devices, including vagrancy laws, that leveraged 
both racial targeting in the criminal justice system and the economic vul-
nerability that was the legacy of slave emancipation without forty acres 
and a mule.58 
The peonage cases established a number of principles that suggest 
how carceral child support enforcement might be analogized to peonage 
and likewise run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment. More generally, 
these principles help sensitize the modern reader to the rationalizations 
once offered for a racist system of entangled criminal justice and labor 
subordination, a system now abhorred yet echoed in “common sense” 
justifications for today’s criminalization of unemployment. 
A. The Present Involuntariness Principle 
One important principle firmly established by the peonage cases is 
that the requisite “involuntariness” is determined by the worker’s will-
ingness to work at the time the work is performed or refused.59 The base-
line is that even a legally binding contractual commitment to work in the 
future—a commitment voluntarily undertaken—cannot be enforced by 
compulsion. “It is the compulsion of the service that the [antipeonage] 
statute inhibits, for when that occurs, the condition of servitude is creat-
ed, which would be not less involuntary because of the original agree-
ment to work . . . .”60 Thus, the presence of even a legal obligation to 
work, including one voluntarily assumed, is irrelevant. 
My three examples above all involve legally imposed duties to 
work that attach to the voluntary conduct of procreation or criminal of-
fending. Even if we take those systems at face value, without interrogat-
                                                                                                                       
(1942); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529–30 (1944); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 
(1944); see also Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 691–92 (M.D. Ala. 1903); United States v. McClellan, 
127 F. 971, 974–75 (S.D. Ga. 1904); Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 334 (Ala. 1904); Ex parte Drayton, 
153 F. 986, 997 (D.S.C. 1907); State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 780–81 (Miss. 1913); Taylor v. Unit-
ed States, 244 F. 321, 330 (4th Cir. 1917); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944). 
 57. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 139–40. 
 58. See Huq, supra note 6, at 354–55, 358–63, 387 (reviewing literature); Birckhead, supra 
note 25, at 1609–26 (same). 
 59. This resolves legally a variant of the classic problem in contract theory of whether binding 
oneself to extended servitude expresses or violates the relevant notion of freedom. See Anthony T. 
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 794–96 (1983). 
 60. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242; accord Pollock, 322 U.S. at 7–9. 
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ing selective or trumped-up enforcement, the peonage cases specifically 
distinguish the legal validity of duties to work from their means of en-
forcement. An obligation to work may be enforced through an action for 
damages, but its fulfillment may not be physically coerced. 
B. The Unjustified Quit Principle 
The peonage cases went beyond the right to quit in defiance of a le-
gal obligation voluntarily assumed. Not only did they focus on present 
involuntariness, they also rejected any substantive review of the validity 
of the worker’s present reasons for quitting. The statutes that the peonage 
cases struck down generally limited prosecution to individuals who 
failed to work “without good and sufficient cause”61 or “without good 
and sufficient excuse.”62 These limitations did not save the statutes by 
reserving coercion for those without good reason to refuse work. Instead, 
the worker’s right to quit in breach of contract applied “however capri-
cious or reprehensible” that action might be.63 Among other things, this 
principle reflected a practical concern for the uncertain resolution of 
claims to just cause. “The law provides no means for determining the 
justice of his excuse, at any time, in any mode, in any tribunal, unless he 
first risks the penalty of hard labor” by quitting.64 
C. The Work-Under-Threat Principle 
This emphasis on practical effects also underlies the approach taken 
in the peonage cases to the legally relevant concept of coercion. That 
conception embraces an ex ante perspective focused on work in the 
shadow of threats, not an ex post perspective focused on labor procured 
once the threat is carried out. The prototypical peonage case involves the 
criminal prosecution of a worker who quits. The result of that prosecu-
tion is not the return of the worker to the original employer. Instead, the 
result is incarceration or a sentence to hard labor for the state or some 
other third party to the original contract. 
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to situations where 
the law “authorize[s] the employing company to seize the debtor, and 
hold him to the service” or authorizes the “constabulary to prevent the 
servant from escaping, and to force him to work out his debt.”65 To the 
contrary, it reaches situations that “make criminal sanctions available for 
                                                     
 61. See, e.g., Taylor, 315 U.S. at 29. 
 62. See, e.g., Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 142. 
 63. Taylor, 315 U.S. at 30. 
 64. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 686 (M.D. Ala. 1903); accord Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 334 
(Ala. 1904). 
 65. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244. 
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holding unwilling persons to labor.”66 When “labor is performed under 
the constant coercion and threat of another possible arrest and prosecu-
tion in case he violates the labor contract . . . and this form of coercion is 
as potent as it would have been had the law provided for the seizure and 
compulsory service of the convict.”67 
Moreover, threats can render work involuntary, even if actually car-
rying out those threats would not cause the work to be performed. Once a 
worker is thrown in jail, he might not be forced to perform the work he 
had been obligated to do, nor any other work at all. In peonage and in my 
three contexts, what matters is the work that must be done to avoid the 
threatened incarceration or prosecution. Whether any work would be 
extracted once the threat was carried out is beside the point. 
D. The Insufficient Alternative Principle, At Least With Regard to Pay-
ment 
Underlying the work-under-threat principle is the more general 
point that work cannot be rendered “voluntary” in the constitutionally 
relevant sense merely because the worker had available a “choice” other 
than the work in question.68 A robbery can proceed by offering the 
choice “your money or your life.” Similarly, offering the choice between 
work and incarceration imposes involuntary servitude. The fact that a 
worker rejected the alternative—incarceration—and chose work makes it 
no less involuntary. 
This principle relies on a judgment about the inadequacy of the al-
ternative to work. That judgment requires some challenging line-drawing 
along a continuum of slightly less unpleasant alternatives, stretching 
from incarceration to a criminal fine to a public condemnation. Indeed, 
this is a general problem with notions of involuntariness and coercion. 
This line-drawing difficulty leads, in one direction, to the notion that all 
work under capitalism is “involuntary” insofar as the proffered alterna-
tive is starvation.69 In the other, it leads to Justice Holmes’s able Bailey 
dissent in which he reasoned that criminal penalties for breach differ on-
ly in degree, not in kind, from the “disagreeable consequences” of civil 
damages.70 
                                                     
 66. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
 67. Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 146. 
 68. See generally ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); Pope, supra note 6. 
 69. On “wage slavery,” see, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE 
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); CAROLE 
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Vandervelde, supra note 10. 
 70. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 246. 
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The peonage cases draw a constitutional line across the slippery 
slope. They establish that if nothing else, exposure to criminal prosecu-
tion—and ultimately to physical custody—constitutes an alternative in-
sufficient to bless a choice to work as “voluntary.” But there is an addi-
tional difficulty in these cases, one facilitated specifically by the linkage 
to debt. 
The statutes in question generally allowed the worker to escape 
criminal liability by paying off his debt to the employer. Thus, the work-
ers faced three choices: work, jail, or pay. This third option received re-
markably little scrutiny in the cases, presumably because of the obvious 
structural fact that the workers in question had no resources with which 
to pay. That was why they were vulnerable to peonage premised on the 
employer’s advance of wages at the outset of employment. Nonetheless, 
the courts were explicit that this formal payoff option made no differ-
ence.71 This rule cohered with the principle, widely enshrined in state 
constitutions, abolishing imprisonment for nonpayment of private 
debts.72 Thus, if a worker could not be forced to choose between pay-
ment and jail, nor between work and jail, then putting them all together 
in a three-way choice could not improve matters. 
This inability of a payoff option to immunize forced labor from 
Thirteenth Amendment condemnation has been strengthened by subse-
quent constitutional developments. As a matter of substantive due pro-
cess, someone cannot be incarcerated for nonpayment if she lacks the 
ability to pay.73 Indeed, in the current child support and criminal justice 
debt contexts, the present inability to pay is the premise of the obligation 
to work. For child support, the source of the duty to work is the duty to 
acquire the means to pay even if one presently lacks those means. For 
criminal justice debt, mandatory work operates to satisfy in-kind a debt 
that cannot be satisfied in cash; it typically is confined to circumstances 
in which the present inability to pay has been established.74 
Accordingly, the formal option to avoid both work and jail by pay-
ing off the debt makes no difference. For the worker who has no ability 
to pay, it would be unconstitutional to jail her for nonpayment. Adding 
an independently unconstitutional option—pay or jail—cannot cure the 
infirmity of an otherwise unconstitutional choice between work and jail. 
                                                     
 71. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 144. 
 72. See, e.g., Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 687 (M.D. Ala. 1903); see also Ann K. Wagner, The 
Conflict over Bearden v. Georgia in State Courts: Plea-Bargained Probation Terms and the Specter 
of Debtors’ Prison, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 383, 383 (2010). 
 73. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1971); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 
(1983); Turner v. Rogers, 546 U.S. 431 (2011). 
 74. See sources cited supra note 26. 
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III. SEAMEN AND PEONS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARGINALIZATION OF 
ROBERTSON 
These principles from the peonage cases erect a wall between pri-
vate employment and state violence, a wall in which Robertson appears 
as a crack. The peonage cases culminated in Pollock, where the Supreme 
Court declared flatly that “no state can make the quitting of work any 
component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding 
unwilling persons to labor.”75 That principle is essential “to maintain a 
system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United 
States” because “[w]hen the master can compel and the laborer cannot 
escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no 
incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome condi-
tions of work.”76 Consistent with the unjustified quit principle, this no-
tion avoids case-specific inquiries into the conditions of work. Instead, it 
specifies the worker’s baseline bargaining position within a private labor 
market.77 
Robertson is flatly inconsistent with Pollock’s principles. But Rob-
ertson came first, and so the early peonage cases faced the opposite prob-
lem: before the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to strike down 
criminal enforcement of private labor contracts, the Supreme Court’s 
then-recent pronouncement in Robertson would have to be distinguished. 
The courts managed this problem by sequestering Robertson to a pile of 
Thirteenth Amendment exceptions. Just before the Supreme Court first 
took up the topic,78 a leading lower court peonage opinion had already 
posed the problem of Robertson thus: “There are many persons, other 
than those duly convicted of crime, who may be compelled against their 
will to perform ‘labor or service.’”79 
A. The Two General Exceptions: Work for the Family or the State 
These Thirteenth Amendment exceptions, now routinely recited by 
the courts,80 generally fall into two categories that carry through to the 
subsequent case law. First, there are children, who could be compelled to 
                                                     
 75. Pollock v, Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
 76. Id. at 17–18. 
 77. See Huq, supra note 6, at 363–67 (discussing the complementarity between Thirteenth 
Amendment peonage jurisprudence and the constitutionalization of laissez-faire during the same 
time period). 
 78. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
 79. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1903). 
 80. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (“Our precedents reveal that not all 
situations in which labor is compelled by physical coercion or force of law violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment.”). 
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work by their parents or, when apprenticed, by their master.81 Second, 
and continuous with the textual exception for penal servitude, there is the 
discharge of duties owed to the state—principally military service—but 
also the ancient custom of the corvée, by which adult citizens were taxed 
in labor and obligated to join crews on public works, especially roads.82 
Robertson’s seamen, however, do not fit easily into either of these 
two conceptually coherent categories of children subject to paternalistic 
governance and duties owed to the state. Instead, as waged labor in the 
market, they were in public, vis-à-vis the family, and in private, vis-à-vis 
the state.83 Positioned this way, Robertson’s authorization of compelling 
private seamen’s labor came to stand as a bare holding unsupported by 
any general principle, an exception without any apparent rationale. In the 
Peonage Cases, the district court simply tacked on the acknowledgement 
that “[t]he law also permits the exaction of involuntary service in cases 
of sailors in the merchant marine who have signed a contract to perform 
in voyage, etc.”84 Of course, the contractual nature of the obligation was 
                                                     
 81. See id. at 944 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment did not disturb “the right of parents 
and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards”); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 
275, 298 (1897) (Harlan J., dissenting) (noting that apprentices were free to leave upon reaching 
adulthood). On the limitations on applying the Thirteenth Amendment to a patriarchal master’s 
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STANLEY, supra note 69; James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment at the Intersection of Class 
and Gender: Robertson v. Baldwin’s Exclusion of Infants, Lunatics, Women, and Seamen, 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 901 (2016). 
 82. See generally Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military conscription); Butler v. 
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (public road work); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (pre-
trial material witness); Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944. James Gray Pope suggests that these cases need 
not be construed as exceptions at all, but rather could be understood to flow from a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, “servitude,” which involves work under a master’s direction and for his 
benefit, and, on the other, “civic duties, which are performed under the direction of representative 
government for the benefit of the people.” See Pope, supra note 6, at 1515. I doubt that construction 
can hold because it obscures distinctions between immediate and ultimate purposes and between 
agents and principals. To test the intuition, consider whether the government could conscript citizens 
into employment in government enterprises providing ordinary consumer services, the revenue from 
which funded general government operations. This would be work under the direction of democratic 
government and for the benefit of the people, but I doubt that would save it from being “servitude.” 
Some more particularized account of the specific forms of work and the specific obligations to per-
form it seems necessary to support the “public duties” cases. Pope’s interpretation of “servitude” 
also invites the further question of whether parental authority to compel children to work productive-
ly, authority that involves neither democratic control nor a public beneficiary, falls outside of “servi-
tude” or instead represents an implied exception. See Pope, supra note 81. Similar problems arise in 
circumscribing the legal category of “employment,” which likewise struggles at once to confine its 
purview to labor markets and to recognize the permeability and ambiguity of their boundaries. See 
generally Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic 
Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857 (2008). 
 83. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal 
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983). 
 84. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 671, 681–82; see also Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944. 
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irrelevant on the court’s own reasoning in adopting the present involun-
tariness principle,85 and so all that was left was simply Robertson’s hold-
ing. Similarly conclusory are the Supreme Court’s references to Robert-
son in Clyatt, which expressly refused to “stop to consider any possible 
limits or exceptional cases, such as the service of a sailor.”86 
B. Constructing the Seamen Exception 
The exceptional character of seamen specifically, however, had to 
be constructed by the subsequent cases. Robertson had offered several 
rationales for its holding, rationales that arguably applied quite widely 
throughout the labor market and well beyond the merchant marine. The 
first rationale—that service was not involuntary when pursuant to prior 
agreement87—was quite general and would have applied to all labor con-
tracts. The peonage cases, however, thoroughly repudiated this holding 
with the principles of present involuntariness, unjustified quitting,88 and 
work under threat. At that point, it was necessary to address more specif-
ic aspects of service at sea.89 
1. The Public Interest in Orderly Labor 
Robertson offered two other rationales for coercing sailors that 
might readily have been extended to Black agricultural labor in the Jim 
Crow South. First, there was the functional justification that ships were 
vulnerable to sailors’ desertion “at a critical moment” or “at some place 
where seamen are impossible to be obtained.”90 The concern, in other 
words, is that when a right to quit actually delivers substantial bargaining 
power to labor, namely when workers are not readily replaceable, labor 
markets become markedly less appealing to employers.91 Implicitly, 
while the Thirteenth Amendment might be meant to shield workers from 
                                                     
 85. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 680. 
 86. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905). 
 87. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 88. In Bailey, the Court noted that the “sufficient cause” provisions could be construed merely 
as limiting liability to actual breaches and thereby to conduct within the scope of obligation under-
taken in the contract. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 234 (1911). Bailey then took pains to 
reject compulsory compliance with such obligations. See id. at 236–38. 
 89. On this aspect of the transition from Robertson to the peonage cases, see Pope, supra note 
81, at 148–88. 
 90. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 283. Of course, the reverse is also true, that seamen are structurally 
vulnerable to abuses when they have no practical ability to leave, find other work, and return home. 
See White, supra note 7, at 287. Cf. ROBIN D. G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA 
COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 161 (2015) (1990) (noting sharecroppers’ similar 
vulnerabilities).  
 91. On the authoritarian aspects of shipboard labor relations, see generally White, supra note 7, 
at 281–89. 
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the worst abuses,92 the right to quit was not meant to deliver a degree of 
power that would disrupt the basic structure of workplace hierarchy and 
employer control over labor.93 
This concern about maintaining hierarchical labor discipline was 
very much alive in the Jim Crow agricultural South, where it obviously 
intersected with racial hierarchy.94 Courts grappled with these considera-
tions explicitly and seriously, but ultimately they did not follow Robert-
son’s approach. In the Peonage Cases, Judge Jones accepted that 
“[e]very reflecting man recognizes the great evils resulting from the 
abandonment of farms by laborers and renters, without justifiable excuse, 
after obtaining advances and incurring indebtedness to the employer, 
sometimes leaving the crops when it is almost impossible to secure other 
labor to save them.”95 Having conflated the timing question with the is-
sue of advances, the court upheld an Alabama false pretenses statute.96 
Just four years later and emboldened by the Supreme Court’s inter-
vening Clyatt opinion, Judge Brawley, struck down an identical false 
pretenses law in South Carolina.97 He did so after rejecting the state’s 
argument that “the case of the petitioners here is analogous to that of 
sailors who had embarked on a voyage; that their continuance in the ser-
vice of their employer was as essential to the safety of the crop as the 
service of sailors to the safety of the ship.”98 As Judge Brawley noted, 
the functional concern about employers’ vulnerability to gouging is vast-
ly narrower than a general prohibition on quitting.99 He dryly observed 
that the sailor analogy lacked credibility in a case in which workers were 
“arrested and imprisoned in January, when probably there is not seed in 
the ground.”100 
Judge Jones’ earlier Peonage Cases opinion also acknowledged an-
other functional concern, one arising from safety considerations. In ex-
treme cases it could be appropriate to criminalize a sudden and unrea-
sonable quit when necessary to “prevent the endangering of life, health, 
                                                     
 92. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
 93. Cf. Sanjukta Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective 
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 94. KELLEY, supra note 90, at 37. 
 95. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 690 (M.D. Ala. 1903). 
 96. See id. Unlike those later struck down by the Court, the Alabama statute imposed no pre-
sumption of fraudulent intent from the bare fact of quitting, though even that would not have saved it 
under Pollock’s reasoning. See Pollock, 322 U.S. at 19–20, 23–24. 
 97. Ex parte Drayton, 153 F. 986 (D.S.C. 1907). 
 98. Id. at 994. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.; see also Pollock, 322 U.S. at 22 (noting that none of the peonage cases seen by the 
Court involve plausible factual allegations of fraudulent intent). 
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or limb, or inflicting other grievous inconvenience and sacrifice upon the 
public.”101 The hypothetical demonstrating this involved a railroad dis-
patcher who abandons his post while trains are speeding toward colli-
sion. The Clyatt Court glancingly acknowledged this “power of the legis-
lature to make unlawful, and punish criminally, an abandonment by an 
employee of his post of labor in any extreme cases.”102 Notably, howev-
er, it drew no connection between that concern and its earlier citation of 
Robertson, which it characterized purely as a case involving sailors. 
In short, just a few years after Robertson, courts refused to use it as 
a template for allowing various extreme scenarios to justify routine com-
pulsion throughout an entire occupation. Instead, at most, criminal penal-
ties would have to be narrowly tailored to circumstances that actually 
reflected criminal intent to exploit vulnerabilities in the production pro-
cess either for personal gain or in endangerment of public safety. Robert-
son itself contained no such limitations. 
2. Labor Paternalism 
The second potentially generalizable feature of Robertson was its 
contemptuous view of the capacities and liberties of sailors. Extending 
the comparison to children’s compulsion by parents and masters, the 
Court explained that 
seamen are treated by congress, as well as by the parliament of 
Great Britain, as deficient in that full and intelligent responsibility 
for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, and as needing 
the protection of the law in the same sense in which minors and 
wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and guardians.103 
Seamen, in other words, were not the sort of people for whom the Thir-
teenth Amendment’s “system of free labor” was designed, free and equal 
citizens who could look after their own interests in the market.104 
                                                     
 101. Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 685. 
 102. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905). 
 103. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897). 
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Such a view of sailors was hardly distant from, or less self-serving 
than, white Southern elites’ views of Black laborers.105 In Ex parte Dray-
ton, South Carolina defended the need for compulsion by invoking the 
“peculiar conditions of agricultural labor,” conditions that included not 
only the vulnerability of harvest time but also the fact that “[t]he great 
body of such laborers . . . are negroes.”106 Their “[b]eing without any 
financial responsibility,”107 the ordinary civil remedies for breach were of 
no use, and so the whip was needed. Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, while striking down a labor enticement statute, sympathized with 
the legislature’s effort to deal with the “fickle laborers in our cotton 
country” in order to achieve “more stable labor conditions.”108 
Here, of course, was the point at which the peonage cases, though 
formally insistent on their race neutrality,109 most directly integrated race 
and labor. Consider Justice Harlan’s dissent from the Robertson majori-
ty’s view of sailors, remarking: 
To give any other construction to the constitution is to say that it is 
not made for all, and that all men in this land are not free and equal 
before the law, but that one class be so far subjected to involuntary 
servitude as to be compelled by force to render personal services in 
a purely private business, with which the public has no concern 
whatever.110 
This passage could just as well have been directed at peonage’s justifica-
tion as an institution of white supremacy. 
The irony in this was that poverty, racial hierarchy, and employ-
ment instability—all of which were marshaled to justify compulsion—
also were invoked to opposite effect by critics of peonage. The poverty 
that rendered laborers judgment-proof also left them vulnerable to 
schemes that leveraged debt into compulsion or that cut off the ability to 
change employers. As Judge Jones explained, 
It is a matter of common knowledge that nearly all the farm laborers 
and land renters in the counties of this state to which the statute is 
applicable are men of very little means, and must rely upon advanc-
es or have work to support themselves and their families at all 
                                                                                                                       
Amendment protection and being included in statutory protective legislation were both marks of 
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 105. See Huq, supra note 6, at 377; Pope, supra note 6, at 1498. 
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 108. State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 780 (Miss. 1913). 
 109. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231, 241 (1911); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 
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times. . . . He must stay there, or else, leaving, must starve, or go to 
work elsewhere . . . .111 
The need for “more stable labor conditions” attributed to Black workers’ 
“fickle[ness]” was instead attributed by Judge Brawley to labor condi-
tions themselves: 
Unceasing toil, scant remuneration, and dreary isolation have a nat-
ural tendency to drive him to more inviting fields. Manufacturing 
establishments, the railroads, lumber camps, and phosphate mines 
drain the best laborer from the fields of agriculture, and whatever 
may be the remedy for existing conditions, certainly the remedy is 
not to be found in statutes which claim him to the soil and force him 
to labor, whether he will or not. Human nature revolts at it, and he 
will escape it if he can. It is by improving his condition, and not still 
further degrading it, that the remedy may be found.112 
Judge Jones’s references to “men of little means” and Judge Brawley’s to 
“the best laborer[s]” and “human nature” seem to incorporate Black 
workers into the class deemed eligible for “free labor,” attributing their 
labor conditions not to their “irresponsibility” or “fickleness” but instead 
to rational action under oppressive conditions.113 Pollock’s insight con-
tinued in this vein, reasoning that “improving his condition” required 
protecting “the right to change employers” and thereby providing a po-
tent weapon in “defense against oppressive hours, pay, working condi-
tions, or treatment.”114 
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Finally, it bears noting that agricultural exceptionalism, grounded in 
the South’s system of racial labor subordination, was itself no stranger to 
labor policy during precisely the period when the anti-peonage principles 
took root. Agricultural exceptions ran through all the major New Deal 
labor statutes.115 Accordingly, it was an interesting, important, and hardly 
inevitable feature of constitutional development during this period that 
no analogous exception festered in the Thirteenth Amendment,116 despite 
the door Robertson had left ajar. 
C. Traditional Servitude 
By the time the peonage cases were through with it, Robertson 
seemingly had been reduced to a bare exception for sailors, stripped of 
legal relevance by the repeal of the statutes it upheld, and unadorned by a 
rationale that could apply elsewhere. Indeed, by 1944 when Pollock 
paused to duly acknowledge that “[f]orced labor in some special circum-
stances may be consistent with the general basic system of free labor,” it 
limited itself to the penal and public duty exceptions and did not deign to 
cite Robertson.117 
The most that remained to be said for Robertson was the majority’s 
reliance on historical practice. “[E]ven if the contract of a seaman could 
be considered within the letter of the thirteenth amendment, it is not 
within its spirit”118 because “the amendment was not intended to intro-
duce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service 
which have always been treated as exceptional, such as military and na-
val enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the 
custody of their minor child or wards.”119 
Justice Harlan was rightly withering in his attack on the majority’s 
appeal to continuity and custom. After all, the whole point of the Thir-
teenth Amendment was to transform the nation’s system of labor and to 
eradicate practices that had long been deeply embedded in law, and in-
deed, in the Constitution itself.120 The majority sought to deflect the point 
by appealing not just to the historical practice of involuntary servitude at 
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sea, but to its historical treatment as exceptional. But the merchant ma-
rine and the majority’s other examples seemed exceptional relative only 
to the post-Thirteenth Amendment baseline of free labor. Antebellum, 
that was far less clear, as Justice Harlan pointed out by noting the conti-
nuity between provisions governing deserting sailors, “runaway serv-
ants,” and fugitive slaves.121 Furthermore, the patriarch’s control over his 
family members’ labor had likewise not been exceptional, but rather, 
entirely of a piece with dominion over a household labor force that in-
cluded servants and slaves.122 
The Robertson majority was right, of course, that once one admitted 
exceptions beyond the textual provision for penal labor, some principle 
was needed to explain which forms of previously bound labor were to be 
incorporated into the mandated market in “free labor,”123 and which were 
not. That remains an important challenge, but whatever the proper an-
swer is—despite several attempts unhelpful to Robertson or subsequently 
abandoned in the peonage cases—“time immemorial” provides a particu-
larly feeble solution. 
IV. APPLYING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE NEW PEONAGE 
I now turn directly to contemporary child support enforcement. My 
concern is with the state’s threat, and actual practice, of imprisoning 
people for being or becoming unemployed when doing so interferes with 
their ability to repay debts created by the state through the child support 
system. 
A. The Peonage Analogy and Limits of Debt 
In the child support context, imprisonment arises on account of 
willful failure to pay ordered child support. But the interesting cases are 
those in which the obligor presently lacks the means to pay. In those cas-
es, courts may still find that the obligor “acted willfully because he failed 
to maintain employment that would have enabled him to meet his child 
support obligations.”124 It is clear, therefore, that the substance of the 
duty to pay includes a duty to work, on pain of imprisonment. 
The relationship between these duties resembles the evidentiary 
presumptions at issue in Bailey and other peonage cases. In Bailey, the 
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Court accepted the propriety of criminalizing fraudulent labor contracts 
but rejected attributions of fraud that could be sustained purely based on 
refusal to work.125 Here, failure to work plays an even more decisive role 
because it conclusively establishes willfulness rather than merely raising 
a presumption of it. 
To be clear, the bare obligation to work does not trigger the Thir-
teenth Amendment concern. Such a legal obligation is unexceptional, 
and so the courts have been understandably contemptuous of non-
custodial parents who raise constitutional objections to the imposition of 
the duty to pay child support and its concomitant duty to work.126 But for 
this same reason, other courts have confused the issue when they have 
sought to justify imprisonment for nonwork by trumpeting the validity 
and wisdom of the underlying child support obligation as “not only a 
moral obligation, but one that is legally enforceable.”127 
Obligations to perform labor contracts are legally enforceable as 
well, but the Thirteenth Amendment limits the means by which compli-
ance may be obtained. Thus, in Moss v. Superior Court, where the obli-
gor conceded that he could be ordered to pay support premised on his 
earnings capacity, he argued that his failure to work to that capacity 
nonetheless could not form the basis for imprisonment.128 A civil money 
judgment was not at issue. Nor were various methods of enforcement 
more aggressive than ordinary civil debt collection yet less severe than 
incarceration for contempt, such as suspension of a driver’s license.129 At 
first glance, then, Moss appears like prototypical involuntary servitude: 
“[T]he victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal 
sanction,”130 and the legal sanction of incarceration in particular. 
More complicated is the specific relation to peonage. Like peonage, 
the child support obligation to work is founded in debt. That this obliga-
tion traces to a court order rather than a private contract is less important, 
because peonage includes debts “forced upon the debtor by some provi-
sion of law.”131 Nonetheless, this compulsion to work grounded in debt 
differs insofar as there is no obligation to work for the creditor in child 
support cases. This distinction may exclude the compulsory work pro-
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duced by child support enforcement from the technical scope of “peon-
age” for the purpose of criminal prosecution under the Antipeonage 
Act.132 
That distinction between employer and creditor, however, hardly 
prevents constitutional classification as involuntary servitude when 
raised by the worker/obligor as a defense.133 If an obligation to Person A 
can be satisfied only by working, and failure to work triggers prosecution 
and imprisonment, the Thirteenth Amendment problems are scarcely af-
fected by whether the work is for Person A or some other Person B. The 
core difficulty would remain: the worker would be bound to Person B by 
the carceral threat, eliminating the leverage that comes with the right to 
quit and subjecting him to the risk of “a harsh overlordship.”134 
B. Compulsory Work vs. Compulsory Work for a Particular Employer 
As the California Supreme Court observed, however, the child-
support-derived obligation “to seek and accept employment” differs from 
the peonage paradigm in a more substantial way. Not only is there no 
compulsion to work for the creditor, the obligation “does not bind the 
parent to any particular employer or form of employment.”135 Work at 
any employer will do, and therefore the worker remains “free to leave . . . 
in favor of another employer.”136 For this reason, the court concluded 
that there was no need to get into the question of Thirteenth Amendment 
exceptions because, without subjection “to any particular employer,” 
there was no “servitude” at all.137 
This is a serious and unusual point, but less impressive than it first 
appears. To analyze it properly, we may usefully abstract away from the 
child support context because this point does not depend upon it. Imagine 
that there were a criminal statute obligating every adult to seek and main-
tain employment.138 This duty to work would be enforced by incarcera-
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tion. Interestingly, such a regime splits apart two features of labor mar-
kets under capitalism. These often are conflated in discussions of when, 
if at all, life in such markets amounts to “wage slavery,” because the only 
alternative to wage work is starvation.139 On the one hand, both scenarios 
allow for choice among particular employers. On the other, my hypothet-
ical ratchets up the degree and form of compulsion; it substitutes “work 
or jail” for “work or starve.”140 
Would there be a “system of free labor” if labor market withdrawal 
were forbidden but free circulation among employers remained? It seems 
doubtful, though I cannot claim to provide a full analysis here.141 It may 
be useful, however, to approach the question by asking whether such a 
system would preserve the right to quit any particular employer, which is 
the premise on which Moss purported to distinguish the peonage cases. 
One of the peonage cases actually considered a closely related 
question. In Reynolds, the Court faced peonage founded in suretyship for 
criminal debts. A defendant, facing a fine that he could not pay, would be 
relieved of incarceration by an employer (the surety) who paid for him 
and to whom he became bound to work off the debt at an agreed rate.142 
Upon quitting work for the surety, the worker faced criminal prosecution, 
additional debt, and entry into another suretyship. There appeared, so far 
as the Court was concerned, to be an open market in suretyships. Thus, 
the worker, once he quit and faced criminal sanction, encountered no 
particular pressure to return to the previous employer. The functional 
result was that “under pain of recurring prosecutions, the convict may be 
kept at labor, to satisfy the demands of his employer.”143 
The distinction between Reynolds and a general criminalization of 
unemployment is hardly apparent. In both cases, the worker is trapped in 
endless labor, and the most that quitting can accomplish is to change 
masters—or be incarcerated. In neither case does the worker have the 
option of withdrawing from the labor market. To be sure, job switching 
in Reynolds was mediated by a criminal prosecution for quitting the first 
surety, but that prosecution resulted in no penalty other than a new mas-
ter and deepening debt. Deepening debt meant that there was no way to 
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escape the cycle by accumulating the assets that would allow for labor 
market withdrawal. That economic barrier to withdrawal, steep as it was, 
is no more difficult to overcome than the absolute prohibition on with-
drawal that I am considering. Therefore, if the withdrawal options—pay 
or jail—in Reynolds were constitutionally insufficient, the same would 
seem to be true for cases like Ballek and Moss. 
Another way to approach the question of a general criminalization 
of unemployment is to ask whether a system of compulsory labor for no 
particular employer really is compatible with an unfettered right to quit 
each particular employer. The work obligation would seem illusory if 
one could always quit a few hours in, at least if there were any frictional 
unemployment in the resulting period between jobs. Indeed, Moss itself 
was cautious in its passing reference to this problem. The court implied 
an unfettered right to switch employers but no such unfettered right to 
quit without a new job in hand. Instead, the court allowed that the child 
support obligor remained “free to resign” only if “the working conditions 
are objectively intolerable.”144 Harking back to the peonage cases, one 
might say that the worker retained the right to quit so long as he had 
“good and sufficient cause,”145 which sounds distinctly more permissive 
than “objectively intolerable.” But recall that the right to quit protected 
by the peonage cases was precisely an absolute right, one not sacrificed 
because it was exercised in “capricious or reprehensible” fashion.146 
Although hardly definitive, this discussion suggests that criminaliz-
ing unemployment among debtors cannot easily be distinguished from 
criminalizing debtors’ labor mobility between employers—the latter be-
ing the evil attacked directly in the peonage cases. At a minimum, pains 
would have to be taken to avoid using the latter as a method to achieve 
the former. Thus, the choice to quit a particular job could not provide the 
basis for establishing inadequate efforts to work. Although such a regime 
is imaginable, it would be far more protective than the one we have. 
Moreover, a robust right to quit any particular job would seem to have as 
its corollary a robust right to refuse any particular job; otherwise, one 
would be left with the empty formalism of accepting and then immedi-
ately quitting. 
C. Robertson Redux: A Child Support Exception in the Private Sector? 
All this suggests that the real action in child support enforcement 
must lie in the specific purpose for which work is compelled. Involuntary 
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servitude it may be, but this just provides another example of the Thir-
teenth Amendment not really meaning what is says when declaring that 
involuntary servitude “shall [not] exist within the United States.”147 Moss 
offered this alternative ground for its holding, and the next year the Ninth 
Circuit relied upon it exclusively, eschewing, though not rejecting, 
Moss’s “no-servitude” reasoning. 
In United States v. Ballek, Judge Kozinski relied on Robertson and 
the other canonical exceptions cases for the proposition that “not all 
forced employment is constitutionally prohibited.”148 To bring forced 
child support labor within those exceptions, the court relied on the “pub-
lic duties” line of cases. It reasoned that nonpayment “raises more than a 
private legal dispute” but instead “is a matter of vital importance to the 
community.”149 Beyond the general public concern for child welfare, 
there also is the purely monetary “interest in protecting the public fisc by 
ensuring that the children not become wards of the state.”150 For this rea-
soning, Ballek relied principally on Butler, the public roads case. 
The difficulty with Ballek is that it threatens to obliterate the pub-
lic/private distinction on which both Butler and Justice Harlan’s Robert-
son dissent relied. Previously, the “public duties” exception has been 
applied exclusively to work performed directly for state entities, whether 
public road crews, in the courts, or in the military. Moreover, this work 
proceeded in sectors totally dominated by publicly compelled labor ra-
ther than competing with workers not subject to like compulsion. Conse-
quently, such labor avoided triggering Pollock’s concern that coerced 
labor’s “depression of working conditions and living standards affects 
not only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his 
labor comes into competition.”151 No such limits apply to child support 
obligations to work. 
Without even noting as much, Ballek adopts the principle that 
forced labor for McDonald’s or any private employer may be clothed 
with sufficient public purpose to keep the Thirteenth Amendment at bay. 
To transform the entire private sector into an exercise in public duty, all 
that is required is for workers to spend their earnings on matters of public 
concern—like paying child support. Surely this proves too much. 
The public interest in private earnings is pervasive. Not only do 
workers spend their money supporting family members, but they spend 
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their money paying taxes, supporting charitable causes, and much more. 
Moreover, private employment has long been cast as the foundation of 
all manner of public virtues, from social integration, to the cultivation of 
self-discipline, to the instruction of children, to the economic independ-
ence on which republican conceptions of political citizenship depend.152 
In other words, Ballek slams a wedge deep into the crack left open 
by Robertson: if the “public duty” class of exceptions can be extended to 
encompass work for private employers, then it can, in principle, be ex-
tended to most modern employment. Doing so, however, threatens the 
premise that rendered those exceptions tolerable. Pollock declared that 
the Thirteenth Amendment aimed “not merely to end slavery but to 
maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the 
United States.”153 It countenanced the occasional oddball exception be-
cause “forced labor in special circumstances may be consistent with the 
general basic system of free labor.”154 Ballek’s reasoning, however, 
would allow the exception to swallow the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
These last observations point to the perpetual frailty of pub-
lic/private distinctions. As the Realists taught, the “private” economy is a 
creature of public law, designed to serve public purposes ranging from 
the sustenance of daily life to the cultivation of individual liberty to the 
maintenance of democratic politics.155 Moreover, economically signifi-
cant work pervades the regions sometimes deemed outside the market, as 
the cases of public roads and military service readily demonstrate. In-
deed, private labor markets routinely are marshaled to supply the labor 
necessary to advance employers’ “noneconomic” purposes.156 Churches, 
prisons, and schools all hire janitors and secretaries, including those mo-
tivated just to make a living and not by loyalty to the employer’s ultimate 
goals. Similarly, someone flipping burgers for McDonald’s may do so to 
earn wages devoted to child support, college tuition, political or religious 
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donations, and so on, even if the employer is motivated to hire her just to 
make a buck. 
Taking these points fully to heart threatens basic structures in which 
the Thirteenth Amendment is embedded and which it has helped bring 
about. Pending a solution to the contradictions of a liberal political econ-
omy, perhaps it is worthwhile to try taking the public/private distinction 
seriously. If we did so, then it would seem that Justice Harlan should 
again be vindicated, that Robertson should be overruled, and that today’s 
criminalization of unemployment should be scrutinized as a new peonage 
that threatens our most basic freedoms. The conclusion is only strength-
ened by the ways in which this new peonage, like the old one, emerges 
from, ratifies, and exploits white supremacy. 
 
